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FISHERIES LAW IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

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Introduction

The fisheries law in force in New Zealand's exclusive economic zone seeks to lay down who may catch what and where. Those who infringe such prescriptions commit an offence triable summarily. The juridical basis for such prescriptions is the customary international law which recognises the validity of such prescriptions. A discussion of the law therefore involves ~~both~~ a consideration of events both at the international bargaining table and at the District Court on a busy Monday morning. Given that New Zealand's fisheries law is the concrete expression of our claim to control the living resources in a considerable area of the South Pacific Ocean, as shown in the map attached, such consideration also raises the question of what New Zealand has done with and what it is likely in the future to do with those resources.

The Law of the Sea

In his paper entitled "Offshore Jurisdiction and Sovereignty" presented at last year's conference, Mr Clarkson indicated the stage at which negotiations then stood on the proposed Convention on the Law of the Sea. As he remarked in the prologue to his paper, the subject is marked by rapid and substantial change. That pattern has continued.

The product of the resumed ninth session of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place at Geneva from 28 July to 29 August 1980, was a draft convention in 320 articles, described as an "informal text". At the conclusion of that session, there was good reason to believe that there was general international agreement on the substantive provisions of the convention, and that subject to the resolution of technical matters such as redrafting to ensure consistency throughout the text, the convention would in short order be adopted and ratified by most nations of the world.

It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the magnitude of such achievement. Classically the law of the sea was concerned with the claims of nations to sovereignty over a narrow belt of waters adjoining their coasts, and with questions of navigation and freedom of passage. It is only since 1945, when the Truman Proclamation of that year formulated the claim of the United States to jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the sub-soil and sea bed of its continental shelf, and the rapid growth since then of technology enabling the exploitation of marine resources beyond the seas immediately bordering coastal states, that other questions arose. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf may be regarded as a preliminary canter over the course which was to follow. It was little short of remarkable that, in the 11 years since 1970, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Principles governing the sea bed and the ocean floor, more than 150 nations with a marked lack of identity of interest had been able to reach apparent agreement on all matters affecting the preservation, use, and exploitation of the seas. The draft convention covers not only questions

relating to the exploitation of living resources in the exclusive economic zone, but such diverse matters as piracy, the conduct of scientific research on the high seas, the control of pollution, rules relating to straits used for international navigation, and the delineation of base lines for the measurement of the territorial sea.

However, the confident expectations of the maritime world and the diplomats who departed from Geneva on 29 August 1980 were dashed later in the year following the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency of the United States of America. It soon became apparent that the United States wished to reconsider its assent to the draft convention. Such reconsideration arose first out of pressures from that small group of large corporations which had in prospect the technical capacity to exploit the resources of the deep sea bed: they wanted a better deal than that offered by the draft convention, and saw in the new administration the prospect of improving their rights of access to the deep sea bed. Their desire for commercial advantage struck a responsive chord amongst the laissez-faire ideologues who accompanied President Reagan to the White House. At the just-concluded session at Geneva it was apparent that the United States wished to review its position on many aspects of the draft convention, but that the precise changes it sought were either unclear or undisclosed. What will happen now is uncertain, but the strong possibility exists that unless the United States can resolve its difficulties quickly, the rest of the world will adopt the convention as it stands after the technical re-drafting exercise carried out in Geneva with or without United States participation.

Whatever the ultimate fate of the convention, however, it is unlikely that there can be any serious challenge to New

Zealand's regime of the economic zone, for the simple reason that it is accepted by all nations whose vessels fish in our waters, which nations themselves have similar regimes. Indeed, the universality of recognition of the 12 mile territorial sea and 200 mile economic zone is such that it must be regarded as being sanctioned by customary international law.

The New Zealand Legal Framework

The governing New Zealand statute is the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977. Its predecessor, the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act 1965, claimed for New Zealand rights of control extending only 12 miles from the base line of the territorial sea. The potential size of a 200 mile economic zone, the probability of the discovery within the zone of exploitable resources, such as oil and gas, and the increasing catches of foreign fishing vessels pointed to the desirability of proclaiming such zone. The Maui gas field had been discovered some 20-30 miles off the Taranaki coast in 1969, and although the field was clearly within the area of New Zealand's continential shelf, further offshore exploration could well extend beyond the boundaries of the shelf, which in New Zealand's case is quite narrow. Catches by foreign fishing vessels had increased from a total Japanese fin fish catch in 1971 of about 44,000 tonnes to a peak of 418,000 tonnes in 1977, the year before the exclusive economic zone became effective. It is worth noting that official estimates of the total sustainable catch in the economic zone is pessimistically assessed at 415,000 tonnes per year, and optimistically at 620,000 tonnes. The total catch in 1977, including the New Zealand domestic catch, was nearly 500,000 tonnes. In the light of

these figures, the desirability of control can perhaps be appreciated.

By 1977, it was judged that the international climate was such that the proclamation by New Zealand of a 200 mile economic zone would be accepted both by the United States of America, and by the nations whose distant water fleets were exploiting the resources of the zone.

Internationally, there was conflict between the maritime powers - the major sea-going nations -who wished to preserve untrammelled rights of activity beyond a narrow territorial sea, and the coastal states who wished to extend jurisdiction as far as possible over their adjacent seas. Early proclamations of sovereignty over extended sea areas by Latin American countries such as Ecuador (1946) and Peru had little influence in moulding international opinion on the issue, but beginning with a bilateral agreement between Norway and Canada in the 1950s, a determined effort was made by coastal states to establish the concept of an economic zone as an international norm. In 1976, the United States of America accomplished a major policy shift which soon had the effect of establishing an international consensus within the context of which New Zealand could proclaim its economic zone. Until 1976, the United States had been on the side of the maritime nations, favouring freedom of navigation over coastal states' rights of control. However, in that year, responding to pressure from the fisheries lobby, a group of powerful senators swung United States policy around to favour the establishment of an economic zone. The USSR and Japan successively followed suit in order to protect their own coastal fisheries resources.

In the result, therefore, there was no international challenge to the legitimacy of New Zealand's proclamation of an exclusive economic zone. The delay in negotiating a fisheries agreement with Japan, referred to by Mr Clarkson in his paper presented at last year's conference, arose not from any reluctance on the part of Japan to accept New Zealand's control of the zone, but solely because of disputes with the Japanese Government over reciprocal rights of access to the Japanese markets of our agricultural products - the so called "squid pro quo" debate.

In practice, the operators of foreign fishing vessels operating in New Zealand's economic zone plainly regard our law as "fair enough", on the basis that their own legislation is in similar terms. This very direct comparison has been made to me by both Japanese and Russian industry executives.

I have already indicated the structure of the zone in broad terms. Its boundaries are illustrated on the diagram attached. The zone is described by section 9 of the Act as:-

> "Those areas of the sea, sea bed and sub-soil that are beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of New Zealand, having as their outer limits a line measured seaward from the base line described in sections 5 and 6 of this Act, every point of which line is distant 200 nautical miles from the nearest point of the base line."

The breadth of the zone is in accordance with the provisions of Article 57 of the draft convention. Other provisions of the Act relating to the establishment of the base line at

the low water mark along the coast of New Zealand, and provisions relating to the treatment of islands, bays, low tide elevations and the like are in accordance with the provisions of the draft convention. The territorial sea established under section 3 of the Act comprises those areas of the sea between the base line and a line measured seaward 12 nautical miles distant from the base line. By section 7 of the Act, the bed of the territorial sea, and of internal waters, which are the waters inside the base line, are declared to be vested in the Crown. These provisions also are consistent with the provisions of the draft convention. By section 10 of the Act, the seas in the exclusive economic zone are declared to be part of New Zealand fisheries waters, and section 14 prohibits foreign fishing craft from being used for fishing within the zone except in accordance with a licence issued by the Minister of Fisheries.

The Act then proceeds to provide for the assessment of the total allowable catch for every fishery within the zone, for the deduction from that total of the portion that New Zealand domestic fishing craft have the capacity to harvest, for the apportionment of the balance of the total allowable catch amongst countries other than New Zealand, and for licensing, regulating and enforcement procedures. Such provisions are in accordance with Article 62 of the draft convention.

There are three points arising from the legislation which require comment at this stage.

First, it will be noted that the proportion of the total allowable catch available to foreign vessels is what is left over after deducting from the total the portion that New

Zealand vessels "have the capacity" to harvest. Sections of the New Zealand domestic industry take the view that the domestic industry is entitled to priority not just for that part of the resource which it has historically harvested, but also that part of the resource which it is able to harvest with its existing vessels and equipment. Foreign interests argue on the other hand that the absence of any sort of track record in relation to the harvest of particular species is fatal to any claim by the domestic industry for priority. The phrase "have the capacity" is also used in the draft convention. The point has particular relevance in relation to the hake fishery. There are estimated to be about 2,000 tonnes of hake to be caught annually in a two or three month period off the West Coast of the South Island. The fish is a desirable one with considerable export potential. The hake usually congregates near the landward edge of the economic zone, and it cannot be denied that local fisherman are able to harvest it. That is, if they can find it. In the recent past, the local fishermen have been dependant upon the sophisticated equipment of the foreign vessels for the location of the fish. There are other similar examples. This, then, is an unresolved issue.

Secondly, the Act lays down criteria for determining the apportionment of the total allowable catch available for allotment to foreign countries amongst such foreign countries. In other words, who gets what. The criteria appearing from section 13 of the Act are the extent to which craft from such countries have habitually engaged in fishing within the zone, the extent to which they have co-operated with New Zealand in fisheries research, the extent to which they have co-operated in conservation and management of the fisheries resource, the terms of any relevant international

agreement, and such other matters as the Minister of Fisheries, "after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs", determines to be relevant. The first three criteria are broadly consistent with Article 62 (3) of the draft convention. The reference to habitual engagement in fishing within the zone explains the enormous leap in the catch by foreign vessels between 1975 and 1977 to which I referred earlier - the foreign vessels were sparing no effort in establishing a track record. The last two criteria - relevant international agreements, and other factors deemed to be relevant - leave the way open for diplomatic bargaining of the "squid pro quo" type referred to earlier.

The third issue relates to enforcement. The Act sets up an elaborate system of penalties. Upon conviction of the licensee, owner or master of a foreign fishing vessel of an offence under the Act or Regulations, or against other New Zealand law, the vessel is automatically forfeited to the Crown, and substantial monetary penalties of up to a maximum of $100,000.00 are also available. However, section 26 of the Act sets up a system of administrative penalties for offences which the Minister considers to be of a minor nature. If this procedure is adopted, then there is no question of forfeiture, written submissions as to penalty are called for, and the maximum penalty which the Minister may impose administratively after considering such submissions is one third of the maximum which would otherwise be applicable. However, if the offence is denied, the issue is referred to the Court, which upon conviction may impose the full range of penalties, and the vessel involved is automatically forfeited. The danger which has been perceived in this procedure is that foreign owners are effectively blackmailed into pleading guilty even though they may

believe they have a good arguable defence either on the law or the merits, because of the possible consequences of a reference to the Court. I have had two or three cases where foreign owners have felt strongly that they had infringed no New Zealand law, but that there was no alternative realistically open to them but to pay up and shut up. It is my experience that foreign owners and masters who have come to the notice of the authorities, whether or not they have subsequently been convicted, have generally been impressed with the fairness with which they are treated and the impartiality of the judges who have tried their cases, and have drawn most favourable comparison with their treatment in other parts of the world. I have little doubt but that similar comments would be passed in relation to Australia. It is in New Zealand's interest that such a reputation be maintained. In the circumstances I have described above where a foreign owner has Hobson's choice as to his response to an administrative penalty notice, the favourable image of our judicial and adminstrative processes abroad can only be damaged.

I now want to say something about forfeiture. It is traditional and universal that fisheries legislation contains provisions for forfeiture upon conviction of offenders. In New Zealand, there is automatic forfeiture of the craft and equipment of a local fisherman who infringes the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1908, which governs fishing in the territorial sea. Those advising the New Zealand Government consider that draconian forfeiture provisions are necessary to provide a credible and effective sanction against infringement of the rules governing the use of the economic zone. What happens in practice after forfeiture of a vessel, whether it be a local vessel or a foreign one, is

that the Minister of Fisheries makes a determination of a fee for which the owner may buy back his vessel. In the case of large foreign distant water vessels, with a high value, such a redemption fee can be high, and it is known that in one case a fee of $300,000.00 was levied.

The difficulty which I as a lawyer have with this system is that the levying of a substantial part of the penalty to be imposed on a convicted person is taken out of the hands of the court and left with a person who has no training in the principles of sentencing, and is not obliged to receive, much less pay any attention to, any submissions made to him on behalf of the owners in assessing the fee. The judge in imposing any monetary penalty called for by the Act upon the conviction of an offender is faced with provisions which call for the imposition of very high fines; but he knows full well that the vessel involved in the commission of the offence is also automatically forfeit, and that he is imposing a sentence with a complete lack of knowledge of the total sum of money which the owners will ultimately be called upon to pay.

It is my view that the imposition of all penalties arising out of a conviction should rest with the judicial officer in charge of the case, who should impose a fine and assess a redemption fee for the vessel at the same time. Thus both the court, and perhaps more importantly the defendant, can be assured that the total cost of a conviction is fairly and publicly assessed on the basis of full and open submissions from all parties concerned.

It is noteworthy that official proposals for a new Fisheries Act, to replace the existing legislation governing fishing

within the territorial sea and internal waters, provides for forfeiture, but also provides for an application to the court for the return of the property forfeited upon payment to the Crown of such amount as the court thinks appropriate, being an amount not exceeding its value as estimated by the Director-General of Fisheries. If we are to have forfeiture, it seems to me that such a provision meets the criticisms noted above.

I say "if we are to have forfeiture" advisedly. It is all very well to speak of forfeiture as a necessary deterrent when negotiating nation to nation. It is a different story when one is confronted with 60 or 70 crewmen and their dependants, whose sole means of earning a livelihood has been confiscated through no personal fault of their own. In countries such as Japan, the cumulative effect of the near world-wide adoption of 200 mile economic zones has reduced distant fishing opportunities, and has therefore reduced employment in the industry. Those men whose vessel has been confiscated, are thereby thrown out of work, and have little prospect of re-employment. Insurance against the consequences of forfeiture is by no means universal, or universally available. I am aware that one company whose vessel was forfeited as a result of New Zealand court proceedings is now insolvent, and its former employees out of work in the way I have described. I do not find it easy to accept readily that the Government of my country should, for whatever geo-political reasons, exercise the power to control the economic survival of a large number of innocent foreigners. I suppose I must concede that the foreign owners of infringing vessels should be bled until they are white, but I do not see any demand of justice which requires that they should be forced into extinction.

There are two further points which I want to make quite quickly in relation to the Act. First, it counterpoints the deliberately loose language in Article 64 of the convention in relation to a highly migratory species such as tuna, by providing that regulations may be made governing fishing for such species within the zone and, in the case of New Zealand craft, beyond the zone. The Americans have always had a particular interest in the tuna fishery, and are reluctant to concede any jurisdiction to coastal states in regulating the taking of such fish. Provisions exist in United States domestic law for the imposition of retaliatory sanctions against nations invoking penalties against American tuna boats. To date any confrontation with the United States on this subject has been avoided by accommodating tuna fishing within joint venture arrangements between New Zealand and American companies.

The second point concerns the Ross Dependency, which is that part of the Antarctic continent in respect of which New Zealand has a dormant claim to sovereignty. If such claim were to be recognised, then machinery exists in the Act for the extension of provisions relating to the economic zone to such area.

There have been some half dozen cases before the New Zealand courts involving foreign vessels charged with infringing the provisions of the Act. The ones I have been involved in have all been exciting and challenging, and I expect that the same is true with the ones I have not been involved in. None of them have, however, raised any fundamental issues of law, because the courts have made it quite plain that they will not go beyond the Act, or attempt to consider its validity in international law. They have treated it as binding according to its terms.

It has been held that the offence of fishing inside the zone without a licence is an offence of strict liability, but it has also been held that on a charge of fishing with a net of less than the permitted mesh size the defendant may lead evidence establishing an absence of mens rea - in that case, by showing that the particular combination of the material of which the net was made, and the water and sea bed conditions encountered had caused the net to shrink.

In another case, where the master of a Japanese squid boat was charged under the Fisheries Act 1908 with fishing within the 12 mile limit, the submission was advanced that no offence had been commited because squid were not "fish" within the meaning of the Act. In this case I learnt a lot about biology. A senior lecturer from the University gave incontrovertible evidence that fish were vertebrate and that squid were invertebrate, and that the two fell into totally separate categories of animal life. That evidence was accepted, but the court held to our disappointment that the statutory definition of the word "fish" was wide enough to include the classification of species into which squid fell.

The last case pointed the difficulties of proof faced by both parties where the issue concerned the infringing of the 12 mile limit. It is easy enough to say that the limit is 12 miles from the base line, but it is another matter to say precisely where a vessel is on the ocean in relation to that limit. The contest was between the radar of an Orion aircraft, the range fixing equipment of which pinpointed a Japanese stern trawler 10.75 miles off the New Zealand coast, and the vessel's echo sounder, which produced an automatic trace. By coincidence the vessel was directly offshore from the sheep station owned by the Minister of

Fisheries. When compared with the hydrographic survey charts of the area, the echo sounder trace established a distance off of some 12.75 miles. I am glad to say that the echo sounder won, but the air force proceded to acquire a great deal of expensive new equipment. In the end, I expect that was a case which no-one lost.

The outcome of the six defended cases to which I have referred is that there have been convictions in four of them and discharges in two. I am quite sure that the discharges are almost equally as important to New Zealand as the convictions, and I know that the senior officers of the Ministry of Fisheries agree with this view. We lose nothing internationally by dealing with these cases in public, dealing with them fairly, and demonstrating that our judicial system is totally independent of and uninfluenced by the views of government ministers, local fishermen or editorial writers. In this respect, I know that we are compared favourably with many other coastal states around the world. So far as Australia is concerned, the High Court case of Li Chia Hsing v. Rankin [1979] ALJR 192 affords evidence of a similar independent approach by the bar and the courts.

The popular image of foreign fishing vessels is that they are scruffy and ill-equipped, and that those who man them are little better than ill-educated pirates. I confess to have boarded one or two vessels which would fit that description. The majority of them, however, are manned by highly educated officers controlling an impressive range of electronic fish-finding equipment, and navigation equipment which would do credit to the bridge of a super-tanker. I can recall one occasion some years ago when I was defending

the master of a Korean fishing boat on a charge under the Marine Pollution Act. At the end of the evidence, to my horror, the judge indicated a desire to inspect the engine room. We arrived at the vessel, a modest sized stern trawler, entirely unannounced and descended direct to the engine room. To my astonishment, it was immaculate and gleaming. The charge was dismissed. The point I wish to make is that we are generally dealing with people of skill and intelligence, with a high investment in equipment, and it is simply not appropriate to brush them aside as a bunch of buccaneers.

The Challenge of the Zone

Earlier I referred to the probable size of the total fisheries resource in the economic zone. Depending on whether one is being optimistic or pessimistic, the zone is estimated to have a sustainable yield of between 415 and 620,000 tonnes. In 1977, the total domestic catch was about 85,000 tonnes. In that year, therefore, the New Zealand fishing industry was presented with the challenge of developing a resource which would sustain at least a five-fold expansion in activity. Any failure to capitalise on the resource would mean that the balance not used would in terms of the draft convention and the Act virtually go by default to foreign operators. I have talked above about the legal framework of sea fishing in New Zealand, how that framework came into being, and how its ground rules have been applied in practice. But to me the real challenge, the real issue to be faced by New Zealand, is the use to which we will put this vast new accretion to our national renewable resources.

For many years the New Zealand fishing industry has been dominated by the one man operator who fishes close to home,

has little in the way of equipment, and is unlikely to stay out for more than two or three nights. There have been traditional fishing communities and traditional fishing families. In Wellington, for example, there has since time immemorial been a close connection between the Italian community and the small scale fishing industry of the type I have mentioned.

There have also been particular fisheries which have been developed to their full potential by local industry. I refer in particular to the Bluff oyster fishery, the scallop fishery, and the rock lobster fishery. All of these fisheries are totally controlled, and appear incapable of further development.

Beyond this, there are a number of companies of modest size engaged in the industry and making a significant contribution to exports. These companies operate processing facilities, supplied both by their own vessels and by owner-operators.

Some brief statistics give an idea of the nature of the domestic industry. There are estimated to be 1,500 fishing vessels in the New Zealand domestic fleet, of which 1,122 are less than 15 metres in length. Of the 3,005 commercial fishermen at sea, nearly 2,000 are employed on vessels under 15 metres in length. Between 60 percent and 65 percent of the catch is exported. It is a small scale industry. The tradition of "one man one boat" is almost as strong as that of "one man one farm".

The opportunities presented by the economic zone have however been quickly appreciated by local businessmen. A

number of major companies which previously had nothing to do with fishing have entered into joint venture arrangements with foreign operators whereby foreign craft have been chartered to New Zealand joint venture companies and operated as New Zealand vessels. Joint venture operators therefore obtain a privileged position compared to foreign operators, as together with the domestic industry they have first bite at the total allowable catch. It should be noted that although joint ventures are nowhere referred to in the Act, they are contemplated by Article 62 of the convention. The advantages for New Zealand in adopting the joint venture system are that we are seen to be moving quite quickly towards full development of the fisheries resource in the zone, whilst at the same time allowing the foreign operators to retain some benefits, that the catch is landed and processed in New Zealand with all that that means in added export value, and that there is a basis for a transfer of technology to New Zealanders and New Zealand operators. From the point of view of the New Zealand participants in such joint ventures, they obtain in addition the profit on the marketing abroad of the catch, and export taxation incentives. However, the government has moved cautiously in the area of joint ventures, and has been prepared to licence them for only two years at a time, with no guarantee that the licences will be renewed. This has meant that companies involved in joint venture operations have found it difficult to formulate forward plans for development and "New Zealandisation" of their operations. The joint venture scheme has been a success to the extent that it has increased New Zealand participation in the explotation of the zone. In 1977 the total catch of joint venture vessels was 6,331 tonnes. The 1980 provisional figure is 102,846 tonnes. In 1977, only about 20% of the total catch was

taken by New Zealand domestic and joint venture vessels, but by 1980 the New Zealand domestic and joint venture proportion of the total catch was of the order of 70%. However, joint ventures with foreign companies chartering foreign vessels manned by foreign crews arguably represent financial and organizational rather than structural changes in the industry, and it is generally accepted that the joint venture system should give way to much greater true New Zealand participation.

The controversy rages as to how New Zealand participation should be increased. On the one hand, there are those who employ the New Zealand vogue phrase "think big". They observe that there is a major resource to be tapped, and that it should be tapped quickly by big investment in big vessels and big processing plants organised through big corporations. Fletcher Challenge, New Zealand's largest commercial enterprise, has a fishing subsidiary which has developed the "think big" philosphy in a confidential submission to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. This has, of course, been leaked to the press. The company draws attention to the fragmented and undercapitalised nature of the New Zealand fishing industry, and aruges that as a consequence the resource is being developed for foreign rather than New Zealand benefit, and that overseas marketing efforts are haphazard and ill rewarded. Fletcher Fishing advocates the formation of three large units capable of competing on equal terms with overseas fishing companies.

This proposal has aroused a storm of outrage mixed with alarm from the traditional members of the industry. They regard the fisheries resource as a bank to be drawn on slowly and developed by a process of organic growth rather

than by the sudden imposition of large structures with heavy demands for capital, which would occupy a monopolistic position in the market place, and place pressure on traditional operators. Development along the lines of the Fletcher Fishing proposal would imply a transfer of manpower from the self employed owner operator to the employed operative in a large enterprise. There are many who foresee adverse social consequences from such a dramatic shift in the nature of employment in the industry.

Whatever happens, it is plain that the foreign operator as such has a strictly limited future in the New Zealand Economic Zone. For diplomatic reasons, there will no doubt continue to be a presence by licensed foreign vessels, and there will always be a place for specialist foreign vessels such as squid jiggers catering for a particular market. Increasingly, however, the resource will be developed and exploited by New Zealanders for their own benefit.

Points for possible discussion

1. Comparison of Australian and New Zealand experience with foreign vessels in the economic zone.

2. Penal provisions, including forfeiture - philosophy and effectiveness.

3. The possibility of a "regional" economic zone which would grant access to the zone to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, including states whose own economic zones are effectively barren.

4. National attitudes to the draft convention on the law of the sea and the present United States position.

5. The economic zone as a bargaining point in foreign policy and international trade negotiations.

6. "Thinking Big" in the fishing industry - social and economic implications.

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

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